Overview
On April 24, US President Trump signed an executive order authorizing deep seabed mining for critical mineral resources, diverting US policy away from alignment with customary international law in favor of US national and economic security. The international response was an initial shocked silence, which has subsequently given way to stark warnings. At issue are elements of the executive order dealing with mining outside US national waters.
Days after the executive order was issued, International Seabed Authority (ISA) Secretary General Leticia Carvalho issued a statement warning that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) currently forbids mining in international waters. She noted that for over 30 years, the US has been a reliable observer and significant contributor to negotiations of the ISA on developing a regulatory framework, calling the executive order “surprising.” Similarly, US allies and rivals alike have expressed concern about or outright condemnation of the US’ intent to exploit what many consider a global natural heritage for economic gain.
While mapping and exploitation of critical minerals in US waters would be relatively less controversial, a constellation of developments is pushing focus to resources located in international waters, specifically the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ), creating an inflection point for international law and parochial interests of national and economic security.
Executive Order: Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources
The Trump administration’s new executive order frames the US policy objective as positioning the US as a global leader in the entire supply chain for critical minerals, from mapping and exploration to extraction and processing, as a national security and economic security imperative. It orders various government agencies to prepare reports, streamline permitting, and strengthen partnerships with allies to develop seabed minerals responsibly, not just within US national waters, but also international waters. The executive order provides the legal basis for exploration licenses and commercial recovery permits in areas beyond national jurisdiction under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act.
The executive order cites the risks posed by China’s growing influence over seabed mineral resources. It tasks the Secretaries of Defense and Energy to determine which critical minerals are essential for applications such as defense infrastructure, manufacturing and energy. The President also seeks an assessment on the merits of using the National Defense Stockpile designation to create a strategic national reserve of critical minerals and the Defense Production Act to spur production through grants and loan authorities.
In what appears to be an effort to bypass the ISA, the President instructs the Departments of State, Commerce, Interior, and Energy to develop a prioritized list of countries to engage and partner with for scientific collaboration and commercial development within their national jurisdictions, but also, if judged feasible, in areas beyond the national jurisdiction of any country, i.e., in international waters.
Inflection Point: Clarion–Clipperton Zone
The US has extensive real estate on the Outer Continental Shelf (the federally-managed ocean area that extends 200 nautical miles from the outer boundaries of state-controlled waters), 50% of which has not been mapped for critical mineral resources as of early 2023. While mapping and exploitation of critical minerals in the US Outer Continental Shelf would bring with it relatively less controversy compared to resources located in international waters, the US may already have its sights on exploiting the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ), which risks triggering disputes with the ISA and signatory countries to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
The CCZ is a 1.7 million square mile area located in international waters between Mexico and Hawaii. It contains the largest known deposits of polymetallic nodules, which are potato-size deposits containing significant percentages of manganese, nickel, copper, and cobalt. The nodules are scattered across the sandy seabed, making them relatively accessible for deep sea mining. The ISA has granted 31 contracts to member countries—and their commercial partners—to explore seabed minerals, most in the CCZ. China has five of these contracts, while the US has none because the US is not a party to UNCLOS.
Canadian company The Metals Company has been a vocal advocate for commercial exploitation in the CCZ. It has been exploring and mapping resources in the CCZ under two contracts issued by ISA and sponsored by the governments of the Republic of Nauru and the Kingdom of Tonga. The Metals Company, along with other commercial seabed mining companies and their country sponsors, have been waiting for the ISA to develop a regulatory regime for the extraction of seabed minerals before the ISA can issue exploitation contracts. ISA has missed multiple deadlines (the most recent being summer 2023) to finalize the regulations due to deep disagreements among member states over whether there should be a moratorium on deep sea mining because the impacts on the marine environment are not fully understood.
At the end of April, The Metals Company, through its US subsidiary, submitted applications to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) for two exploration licenses and one commercial recovery permit under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, for areas in the CCZ. The commercial recovery permit application covers a proposed 25,160 square-kilometer area that the company already mapped in the CCZ. The company estimates that combined, the three areas contain approximately 15.5 million tons of nickel, 12.8 million tons of copper, 2.0 million tons of cobalt, and 345 million tons of manganese.
These are significant resources, and the company is ready to begin exploitation. It has been lobbying the US government, first the Biden Administration and now the Trump Administration, for partnership. The timing is fortuitous—for the Trump Administration, The Metals Company is an attractive partner positioned to enable the government to move forward at speed to implement the new policy.
Opportunities and Risks
The Trump executive order and The Metals Company’s application for a commercial recovery permit change the global context of the debate over deep seabed mining. ISA will have to act or cede regulatory standard-setting to the US. An agreed upon “pause,” currently supported by a large number of member countries including Austria, Canada, France, Germany, and the UK, may become unsustainable, as countries will see an opportunity to follow the US lead, especially those that have argued that pursuing deep sea mining is a matter of national security.
Demand for critical minerals is expected to skyrocket in the next decade, driven by growth in the battery and semiconductor sectors. NOAA has described deep seabed mining as the next gold rush. Building out the supply chain will require investment in processing facilities, waste management systems, and the development of more sustainable technologies. Some estimates project that the deep sea mining sector could grow to $15 billion by 2035.
The unclear regulatory environment poses a number of legal and reputational risks, however. Rather than or coupled with an expedited effort to complete a regulatory standard for mining, ISA could seek to restrain US execution of the new policy through legal challenges. ISA Secretary General Carvalho is taking the position that the US has no right to unilaterally exploit mineral resources outside the legal framework established by UNCLOS, even though the US has not ratified the treaty. While many countries support deep sea mining in principle, there is strong backing for a regulatory regime that will protect the fishing industry and the ocean ecosystem more broadly. The Trump executive order uses the phrase “responsible” mining throughout, a strong indication of the risks of being perceived as acting irresponsibly and damaging the sensitive ocean environment, even for a White House that values action.
There are also geopolitical risks, with the potential of increasing disputes over territorial boundaries and resource ownership. The CCZ could become a high-risk zone, as countries like China seek to “protect” access to ISA-licensed tracts. Exploration in international waters like the Arctic and South China Seas could lead to increased maritime disputes and security dilemmas in already contested areas, particularly among great powers. These disputes could develop rapidly into a tragedy of the commons, fragmented critical mineral chains, or weaker maritime international governance institutions, given the existing tense relationships and the ongoing race for global influence and economic dominance.
