Overview
On July 8, 2025, the US Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division announced a new Whistleblower Rewards Program, offering financial incentives to individuals who supply the Antitrust Division with information that leads to successful criminal antitrust prosecutions. Whistleblowers who submit original, truthful, non-public, and complete information that leads to criminal fines or other recovery exceeding $1 million may receive between 15% and 30% of the penalties collected. This marks the first time the Antitrust Division has used monetary rewards to motivate whistleblowers, signaling a new strategy in its criminal enforcement efforts. While the Antitrust Division’s initiative is in the right direction, the program’s scope is circumscribed, in significant part because of the Antitrust Division’s limited statutory authority.
The program is subject to four limitations. First, the program only concerns conduct that implicates the US Postal Service. The program is a joint initiative with the US Postal Service and the US Postal Inspection Service, because there isn’t any separate statutory authority for an Antitrust Division whistleblower program.[1] The Postal Service has existing statutory authority to recover fines, penalties, and forfeitures in matters affecting its operations, so the new antitrust whistleblower program must be limited to antitrust violations that directly impact the Postal Service’s revenue, operations, or property.[2] Thus, potential whistleblowers must assess whether the conduct they report sufficiently “affects the Postal Service” to qualify for an award.[3] According to the MOU, the Postal Service must have suffered an “identifiable harm” from the reported violation, but that harm “need not be material or otherwise pose any substantial detriment to the Postal Service.”[4] Although the Antitrust Division in its press release indicated that the reward program could apply broadly across various sectors like healthcare and agriculture,[5] it remains unclear whether the Antitrust Division and Postal Service will interpret the mere use of mail in connection with a violation as sufficient to qualify for the program.
Second, there may be uncertainty about whether a particular antitrust violation qualifies for the whistleblower program. Because this program is limited only to criminal antitrust prosecutions, insiders who have potential tips would need to figure out whether the conduct they plan to report constitutes a criminal or civil antitrust matter before they are certain that their report would be eligible for a reward. In addition, the dollar value threshold for governmental recovery may be a barrier, as it might be difficult for a layperson to figure out if a particular violation will result in a fine of $1 million or more, as application of the US Sentencing Guidelines to estimate the likely fine may be challenging for the uninitiated.
Third, in many instances, the people with the most knowledge will be excluded from qualifying for whistleblower rewards. Individuals who learn of the misconduct through their roles as officers, directors, trustees, or auditors of the company, particularly through compliance or auditing functions, are generally excluded. But these individuals are permitted to claim a reward if 120 days have passed since the company discovered or reported the misconduct internally, or if the conduct poses an imminent threat to public health or national security.[6] This restriction aims to preserve the integrity of internal compliance systems.
Fourth, some of the types of violations that could be reported under this whistleblower program could be brought under other existing whistleblower programs that may offer an easier or more lucrative option. If, for example, the antitrust violation gives rise to false claims submitted to the Postal Service (or to other government agencies where the required nexus to the Postal Service can separately be established), it may be a better option for a whistleblower to report the violations as a sealed complaint under the False Claims Act (discussed below), which offers not only a 15-30% recovery from up to a trebling of damages, but also attorney’s fees, a lower burden of proof (preponderance of evidence vs. beyond a reasonable doubt), a lower mens rea (criminal intent versus recklessness), and the right to litigate the allegations even if the Government declines to move forward on them. The Criminal Division’s Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program (discussed below) also covers violations that could overlap with those reportable under this new whistleblower program (including violations by financial institutions, federal health care offenses, and government contract frauds), while offering similar monetary awards and arguably clearer parameters for eligibility (although such reporting would have to result in a criminal forfeiture, which is not available for criminal Sherman Act violations).
Combined, these and other limitations may end up restricting the breadth, scope, and ultimate effectiveness of the whistleblower program: the whistleblower who would be incentivized to come forward under this program would likely have to be a lower-level employee, with sufficient sophistication to understand the difference between a criminal and civil antitrust violation and to know the likely fine to arise from a successful prosecution, and have knowledge of antitrust violations specifically affecting the Postal Service. The program could apply to, for example, a bid-rigging conspiracy for Postal Service contracts or a price-fixing conspiracy among online retailers whose conspiracy resulted in higher prices but fewer sales, thereby decreasing Postal Service revenues because of fewer shipments.
The new Antitrust Division program is added to a number of whistleblower programs the federal government already employs that offers broader and clearer eligibility parameters:
- DOJ Criminal Division: The Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program, launched in August 2024, incentivizes the reporting of corporate crimes, offering up to 30% of any resulting criminal forfeiture.[7] In May 2025, the Criminal Division further expanded that program to include a broader range of criminal violations.[8]
- Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC offers whistleblowers 10% to 30% of monetary sanctions resulting from enforcement actions from violations of the securities laws, including the FCPA.[9] In fiscal year 2023 alone, the SEC awarded more than $600 million to whistleblowers and received over 18,000 tips – an unprecedented level of engagement that highlights the deterrent power of financial incentives.[10]
- Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN): FinCEN operates a whistleblower program under the Bank Secrecy Act, encouraging reports of anti-money laundering violations. Though less well-known than the SEC’s program, FinCEN also offers awards of 10% to 30% of collected penalties and is steadily gaining traction.[11]
- False Claims Act (FCA): Perhaps the most established and far-reaching whistleblower law, the FCA allows individuals to file qui tam lawsuits on behalf of the federal government against companies defrauding public programs. Whistleblowers under the FCA may receive 15% to 30% of the government’s recovery, which as mentioned earlier can run up to a trebling of damages. The statute has proven particularly effective in combating fraud in the healthcare sector, resulting in tens of billions of dollars in recoveries over recent decades.[12]
In comparison, the Antitrust Division’s program appears to be much narrower in scope, primarily because of the narrow available statutory authority. However, it is possible that the Antitrust Division, in conjunction with the Postal Service, may try to interpret the Postal Service’s statutory authority broadly, treating it as an equivalent to the existing mail fraud statute where the mere use of the mail would be sufficient to trigger the authority. Although it is currently unclear whether the Division and Postal Service will employ that broad interpretation, this initiative still reflects Division’s continued focus on increasing criminal antitrust enforcement, which should motivate corporations to create more robust compliance programs that prevent criminal conduct. Perhaps the Antitrust Division’s program will find traction through a public awareness campaign that aims to clarify eligibility by demonstrating swift, transparent, and publicly highlighted administration of the reward during its early implementation. Without sufficient visibility, potential whistleblowers may hesitate to come forward, either because they are unaware of the program’s existence or uncertain whether they can reasonably rely on its applicability to their circumstances. Perhaps with additional statutory authority to cure its limitations, the Antitrust Division will expand its program in ways that will mirror the federal government’s more well-established whistleblower reward programs.
Regardless, companies should take little comfort in the potentially limited impact this new program may have, and should continue strengthening their antitrust compliance program (particularly those aspects of the business involving the Postal Service), including its treatment of allegations of antitrust violations reported by employees internally. To that end, each company should ensure that it has in place an effective internal reporting process, incentives that encourage employee reporting, strong anti-retaliation policy, a robust internal investigation apparatus, and periodic testing to ensure that these measures are operating effectively.
[1] Although the Department of Justice has the ability to grant monetary whistleblower awards through its ability to obtain criminal forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982, § 982 does not cover violations of the Sherman Act.
[2] See 39 U.S.C. §404(a)(7); 39 U.S.C. §2601(a)(2).
[3] See DOJ, Justice Department’s Antitrust Division Announces Whistleblower Rewards Program, (Jul. 7, 2025), available at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departments-antitrust-division-announces-whistleblower-rewards-program.
[4] See DOJ, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Whistleblower Rewards Program and Procedures between the Antitrust Division United States Department of Justice and the United State Postal Service and the Office of Inspector General United States Postal Service, (Jul. 7, 2025), available at: https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1407261/dl?inline.
[5] See DOJ, Justice Department’s Antitrust Division Announces Whistleblower Rewards Program, (Jul. 7, 2025), available at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departments-antitrust-division-announces-whistleblower-rewards-program.
[6]See DOJ, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Whistleblower Rewards Program and Procedures between the Antitrust Division United States Department of Justice and the United State Postal Service and the Office of Inspector General United States Postal Service, (Jul. 7, 2025), available at: https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1407261/dl?inline
[7] See DOJ, Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program, (Aug. 1, 2025), available at: https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1362326/dl?inline.
[8] See DOJ, Criminal Division Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy, (May 12, 2025), available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1400031/dl?inline.
[9] See SEC, Whistleblower Program, available at: https://www.sec.gov/enforcement-litigation/whistleblower-program.
[10] See Geoff Schweller, SEC Whistleblower Program had a Record-Setting 2023 Fiscal Year, (Nov. 15, 2023), available at: https://whistleblowersblog.org/corporate-whistleblowers/sec-whistleblowers/sec-whistleblower-program-had-a-record-setting-2023-fiscal-year/.
[11] See FinCEN, Prepared Remarks of FinCEN Director Andrea Gacki During the SIFMA AML Conference, (May 6, 2024), available at: https://www.fincen.gov/news/speeches/prepared-remarks-fincen-director-andrea-gacki-during-sifma-aml-conference.
[12] See DOJ, False Claims Act Settlements and Judgments Exceed $2.68 Billion in Fiscal Year 2023, (Feb 22, 2024), available at: https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/false-claims-act-settlements-and-judgments-exceed-268-billion-fiscal-year-2023.
