Overview
US President Donald Trump’s visit to the Middle East last week, which included stops in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, showcased the warm relationship between Trump and Arab monarchs and garnered more than 1 trillion dollars in potential investments in the US over the next decade. Notably, however, Trump did not visit Israel during his trip, leading to speculation of a rift between the US and Israel, as Israeli Prime Minister (PM) Benjamin Netanyahu is intensifying the war effort in Gaza, despite growing Western pressure to end it. The visit highlights the growing division between the two leaders, who during President Trump’s last term appeared to nearly operate in lockstep. President Trump’s growing distance from PM Netanyahu’s strategic vision for the region is already impacting regional policy and developments, with Israel out of the loop on key developments and the US prioritizing its own initiatives—namely economic ties—over strategic gains for Jerusalem.
Trump’s Visit Represents a New US Approach to the Region
Trump’s visit represented a clear attempt by the president to continue a years-long effort to redefine the US’ historic role in the Middle East, moving away from being the security guarantor and conflict resolver of the region to a more balanced role that emphasizes bilateral economic relations and regional security solutions. With the trip’s focus on economic partnership, Trump signaled a new American view of Arab states as partners for trade, development, and investments and not just clients for US weapons in the longstanding tradition of a “weapons for oil” exchange. Although there is a need to read the small print in each agreement signed, the agreements provide a successful business model for the future. During the visit, Trump acknowledged the emergence of a new generation of regional leaders who provide an opportunity for a different kind of relationship with Washington. Trump’s approach will be tested over time and will certainly have consequences for the region. The problems of the Middle East are not going away as a result of the visit, with the war in Gaza still unresolved, the Houthis still firing missiles at Israel, and US outreach to Iran not yet producing results.
Trump’s new perspective on the issues of the Arab Gulf and approach to partnerships there has created friction with PM Netanyahu’s conservative coalition government—a rather surprising development, given President Trump’s close friendship with Netanyahu in his first administration. It must be recognized, however, that Trump’s new approach to the region is built upon Israel’s effective military blows against Iran and its “axis of resistance,” as well as the fall of the Assad regime, all of which have shifted the regional balance of power. Iran’s weakened state has allowed others in the region to flourish. While Gulf states had started a more conciliatory turn towards Iran prior to Israel’s regional campaign against Iran and its proxies, the degradation of their capabilities by Israel in the last year has provided more breathing room for Arab capitals to focus on economic partnerships and regional détente.
The Visit’s Impact on US-Israel relations
Trump’s decision not to include Israel in his trip projected a clear image to Israelis: the US and its Gulf allies are warming up ties, while Israel is the “odd man out,” watching the events unfold from afar. Nevertheless, the US-Israeli bilateral relationship remains strong. The administration in its early months provided Israel with the weapons and assistance it asked for to continue its war effort in Gaza, and PM Netanyahu visited Washington twice since Trump returned to the Oval Office, more than any other world leader. However, recent months have exposed a growing and unprecedented divergence in the positions of the US and Israel on a series of regional issues, including the war in Gaza, Yemen, Syria, Iran, and Arab-Israeli normalization.
The War in Gaza
Trump came into office after pledging during the 2024 presidential campaign to “end all wars." Early in his presidency, Trump supported Israel’s objectives of defeating Hamas and releasing Israeli hostages, as he provided Israel with weapons and munitions that were held up by the Biden Administration. President Trump was in the loop on phase one of a ceasefire-hostage release deal reached between Israel and Hamas just days before entering office. Unlike European partners, who were growing visibly frustrated with Netanyahu’s insistence on pursuing a decisive victory over Hamas, the Trump White House was supportive of Israel’s continued fighting in Gaza, did not place a deadline for Israel to end the war, and accepted Israel’s decision to hold off on allowing the provision of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip.
During this period, Trump’s Middle East Envoy, Steve Witkoff, was shuttling between Qatar, Egypt, and Israel attempting to reach an agreement between Israel and Hamas on the implementation of a second phase of a ceasefire-hostage release deal. Witkoff was reportedly becoming frustrated over what appeared to be Netanyahu’s continuous efforts to derail any possible deal, so much so that the US went behind Israel’s back and negotiated directly with Hamas (designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the US) to secure the release of American-Israeli hostage Edan Alexander after 590 days of captivity. As 58 hostages remain in Hamas captivity, the Trump administration is now switching tactics from wholehearted support to pressuring Israel to accelerate negotiations with Hamas, leaving Netanyahu to send a delegation to Doha in an attempt to reach a deal on a second phase. Witkoff is devoting efforts behind the scenes to get to a deal and reportedly does not shy away from a confrontational approach vis-a-vis Netanyahu and his inner circle. It remains to be seen if he will succeed given significant pressure from within Netanyahu’s far-right coalition to continue operations in Gaza.
Additionally, as horrific images from Gaza dominate international media coverage, pressure has built on the Trump administration (from within the US and abroad) to do more to ensure the resumption of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Israel, which vowed not to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza until a hostage release deal is reached, succumbed in recent days to US pressure announcing it will allow the resumption of aid.
The US-Houthi Ceasefire
One recent area of divergence between Washington and Jerusalem was the US-Houthi ceasefire, brokered by Oman in early May. President Trump announced that the US would end attacks in Yemen against Houthi targets, as well as the wider US-UK airstrikes on Yemen. In return, the Houthis agreed to halt their attacks on vessels in the Red Sea but emphasized that the ceasefire did not in “any way, shape or form” apply to Israel, which had begun to launch its own strikes on Yemen. Israel was taken aback by Trump’s decision, as it received no prior notification from the US, but publicly acknowledged that the US has the right to act in a way that protects American interests. Nevertheless, as Trump visited the Gulf, Houthi missiles were launched at Israel several times, while the Israeli air force retaliated and struck Houthi targets. Oddly, US Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, told Israeli TV that while he understands Israeli frustrations, the US will not intervene against the Houthis unless “a Houthi missile hits an American in Israel.”
The US Policy Change on Syria
Similarly, the US and Israel are divided over Syria policy. In a speech delivered in Riyadh, Trump announced the cessation of US sanctions on Syria. The next day, he met with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa (who is designated as a terrorist by the US). This 180-degree shift in US policy on Syria caught Israel off guard as (again) it had no prior knowledge of the decision. Israel is not pleased with this change in US policy: in their view, al-Sharaa is a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” because of his jihadist background, and Israel was hoping for sanctions to continue and for Syria to remain weak and divided rather than consolidating power as a potential new regional enemy with the capacity to oppose Israel. The US, on the other hand, lifted sanctions in a bid to avert Syria’s collapse, wary of the new risks posed by a failed state on its allies’ borders, such as providing a safe haven for ISIS or Iranian proxies to reconstitute. The role played by Saudi Arabia and Turkey in facilitating the Trump-al-Sharaa meeting and the lifting of sanctions is another Israeli concern, as Israel understands Trump’s new policy as questioning Israel’s entire strategy in Syria.
US-Iran Nuclear Talks
Trump’s decision in April to launch negotiations with Iran on a new nuclear deal was also not fully coordinated with Israel, and PM Netanyahu looked stunned when Trump announced it at the end of their meeting in the Oval Office on April 7th. Before Trump’s announcement, Israel had been threatening to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities and was hoping that the US would not only support but perhaps join the effort. Trump, however, signaled his preference for diplomacy over a military attack and Witkoff has so far led four rounds of talks (brokered by Oman) with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, much to Israel’s dismay. Israel is continuing with threats to attack but Trump’s diplomatic effort is certainly taking much of the wind from Israel’s sails.
Arab-Israel Normalization
Finally, Trump decided to move ahead in strengthening relations between the US and Saudi Arabia, without waiting for Riyadh to move on Israeli normalization. The Biden Administration went through painstaking efforts to reach a three-way deal in which the US would provide the Saudis with a civil nuclear energy program and sign a defense treaty and the Saudis in return would normalize relations with Israel. Trump began his term with the same intention but the Saudis conditioned normalization with Israel on an agreement by Israel to present a credible path to Palestinian statehood. Netanyahu was not willing to make such a concession (realizing it may lead to the collapse of his coalition) and Trump opted to prioritize US-Saudi relations over a Saudi-Israel deal. Trump wants to expand his flagship Abraham Accords, but he is in no rush to prioritize Israel’s interest in Saudi ties over American economic interests. In the meantime, Saudi-Israeli normalization remains a pipe dream.
The Big Picture
Trump’s visit to the region has further clarified the administration’s approach to the Middle East: the US will pursue its own self-interest and engage in compartmentalized deal-making, even if these run counter to historic commitments and alignments. Beyond its security concerns in preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon and countering terrorism, the US does not seek to put a finger on the scales of regional order, perhaps to Israel’s surprise. With new areas of economic partnership announced, the US’ approach carries upside risks for American industry and investors. In terms of downside risks, the region may continue to see unresolved foreign policy clashes between the major players, none of which are powerful enough to act as a regional leading power: Israel, Gulf Arab powers, and Iran. This could lead to a stable geopolitical equilibrium or pockets of unresolved competition on several issues, ranging from the reconstruction of Syria to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
