Overview
The Seventh Edition of the Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (the SIAC Rules 2025) came into force on January 1, 2025.
The new SIAC Rules 2025 bring about a number of important changes, including:
(i) a streamlined procedure for arbitrations valued under SGD 1 million (approx. USD 740,500);
(ii) express preliminary determination powers;
(iii) a broader expedited procedure, now applicable to disputes up to the value of SGD 10 million (approx. USD 7.4 million);
(iv) mandatory disclosure obligations relating to third-party funding arrangements; and, most notably
(v) a revised emergency interim relief procedure permitting ex parte applications.
The wide-ranging powers of an Emergency Arbitrator now include the making of a protective preliminary order (PPO), on an ex parte basis, "directing a party not to frustrate the purpose of the emergency interim or conservatory measure requested."[1] The expanded emergency interim relief procedure that allows for ex parte applications for emergency relief was a somewhat last-minute, and innovative feature that was added to the SIAC Rules 2025. We anticipate that the procedure will offer welcome protection to parties who have chosen to refer potential disputes to arbitration under the SIAC Rules 2025.
Procedurally, an application for a PPO must be decided within 24 hours of the Emergency Arbitrator's appointment. Shortly thereafter, and in any event within 12 hours of the SIAC Registrar's transmission of an Emergency Arbitrator's decision on a PPO, the applicant must deliver to all parties "a copy of the case papers filed in the arbitration, the Emergency Arbitrator's order, and all other communications, including the content of any oral communication at the hearing, between the applicant and the Emergency Arbitrator,"[2] following which the applicant must provide a statement to the SIAC Registrar and the Emergency Arbitrator to confirm it having done so. The PPO shall lapse after three days if the applicant fails to provide that confirmation.
The PPO shall then expire within 14 days, albeit the Emergency Arbitrator may "issue an order or award adopting or modifying the protective preliminary order, or granting such other emergency interim relief as appropriate, after all parties have been given an opportunity to present their cases."[3]
Any party against whom a PPO is directed is to be given the opportunity to present its case "at the earliest practicable time," following which the Emergency Arbitrator "shall decide promptly on any objection to the [PPO]."[4]
The procedures required pre and post application of a PPO assist in balancing the parties' interests, providing an opportunity to present their cases, and safeguarding due process. However, the enforceability, and therefore practical utility, of any PPO remains uncertain.
Indeed, whilst parties to arbitrations subject to the SIAC Rules 2025 will hope that any PPO would enjoy ready recognition and enforcement in a Singapore seated arbitration, the outcome of any recognition and enforcement efforts is less certain for arbitrations seated elsewhere.
It is of course the case that any party seeking to enforce the terms of a PPO has, at least on the face of it, a clear argument that the PPO arises out of an arbitration procedure by which the parties to the dispute expressly agreed to be bound. It would on that basis, it could be argued, be artificial for any party against which a PPO is made to seek to oppose the enforcement of any such order, for example on the basis of a lack of due process (given the possibility of the PPO having been made ex parte) or some other procedural or substantive objection to the PPO. As above, the SIAC Rules 2025 make express provision for a party against which a PPO is made to challenge the order "at the earliest practicable time" following the making of the PPO.
Nevertheless, it has traditionally been difficult to achieve recognition or enforcement of interim arbitral measures outside of the seat of the arbitration. Previous attempts by other arbitral regimes to introduce similar procedures have proven controversial. Some academic literature on the topic has gone as far as to claim that that ex parte relief in arbitration "virtually never makes any sense or accomplishes any serious purpose."[5] For example, an award from an Emergency Arbitrator would likely face enforcement difficulties under instruments such as the New York Convention (which does not specifically provide for awards made by an Emergency Arbitrator). More generally, an obstructive respondent could well seek to frustrate any enforcement on natural justice grounds, given the ex parte nature of the procedure, particularly if the manner in which the PPO was obtained is far removed from accepted principles in the jurisdiction in which enforcement is sought. For example, jurisdictions such as England and Singapore often seek to balance the parties' interests on interim relief applications by requiring an applicant to provide a cross-undertaking in damages which the respondent would be entitled to enforce against should it later transpire that the interim relief ought not to have been granted and has caused the respondent loss. Arbitrators will need to be particularly cognizant of these issues when ordering PPOs.
Any third party affected by any interim measure could also legitimately claim not to be bound by that measure given its lack of any involvement in the arbitration agreement giving rise to the interim measure in the first place. Furthermore, the PPO may give rise to arguments of public policy contravention depending on the enforcing jurisdiction.
In contrast, it may be that such concerns will not manifest in practice. Indeed, the PPO is temporary relief that expires in 14 days, thereafter, affected parties will have their "day in arbitration" to present their case. This means that overseas enforcement issues of the PPO are probably minimal as there is simply not enough time for any enforcement proceeding on a PPO order to occur outside of the seat of the arbitration. In this regard, the utility in practice would primarily be localized. The ex parte rules would be heavily reliant on the procedural laws of the seat for enforcement to become effective.
However, the practicalities may unfold, what is clear is that the SIAC is innovative, and audacious in its efforts to address real-life problems that parties face when resolving dispute through international arbitration. Indeed, even long before the notice of arbitration is even filed, it is not uncommon for evasive respondents to have already dissipated their assets out of jurisdiction. For arbitrations to have ample utility, these PPOs are welcomed and are co-introduced with the streamlined procedure appropriately. These innovations are not found distantly but near, in plain sight in the mechanisms of court, particularly with respect to ex parte applications. SIAC has set the arbitral landscape in motion by introducing such existing court rules into its arbitral rules by including due process safeguards.
It remains to be seen how other international arbitration regimes will deal with even further truncated interim measures in future iterations of their own rules, whilst for the time being practitioners ought to keep a keen eye on any developments arising out of the application of the SIAC Rules 2025. But what is clear is that parties using the SIAC Rules 2025 now have the additional legal mechanism to protect their interests swiftly and decisively before all is lost.
[1] Schedule 1, Paragraph 25 of the SIAC Rules 2025.
[2] Schedule 1, Paragraph 29 of the SIAC Rules 2025.
[3] Schedule 1, Paragraph 33 of the SIAC Rules 2025.
[4] Schedule 1, Paragraphs 31, 32 of SIAC Rules 2025
[5] G. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 2017-19 (2009).
