Overview
The Sanctions Update, compiled by attorneys from Steptoe’s award-winning International Regulatory Compliance team and the Stepwise: Risk Outlook editorial team, publishes every Monday. Guided by the knowledge of Steptoe’s industry-leading International Trade and Regulatory Compliance team, the Sanctions Update compiles and contextualizes weekly developments in international regulatory enforcement and compliance, as well as offers insights on geopolitical context, business impacts, and forthcoming risks.
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The Lede
EU Moves to Tighten Russia Sanctions as Peace Talks Continue
On November 16, the Council of the European Union listed an additional 101 entities and 12 individuals under the EU’s Russia asset freeze sanctions framework, for their roles in economic sectors that provide substantial revenue to the Russian government and support its shadow fleet. The economic measures cover nearly 50 Russian banks and financial institutions, energy businesses, overseas shadow-fleet intermediaries and individuals associated with the online retailers Wildberries and Ozon. The measures further target companies in third countries, including the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, Seychelles, and Oman, involved in Russian oil trading or in owning, managing, operating, financing, or insuring vessels transporting Russian oil. In parallel, the Council added 30 individuals and one entity to the EU sanctions list targeting Russia’s hybrid activities, including foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). The Council also listed an additional entity under the EU sanctions framework concerning cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States. The Council formally adopted the listings after EU member state ambassadors agreed on November 11 to add approximately 145 entries to Russia-related sanctions lists. By reaching beyond Russian producers to the businesses that process payments, transport oil and facilitate procurement, the EU is seeking to make Russia’s export earnings harder to generate and its wartime supplies harder to obtain.
The adopted energy listings extend pressure on companies that refine Russian oil and organize its export. They could also compound the damage from Ukrainian strikes, which have increasingly targeted complex refinery units used to produce gasoline, diesel and jet fuel. Russian refinery output in June was roughly 30% below the year earlier. Serious damage to these units can take six to eight months to repair, while existing Western sanctions restrict access to some replacement-equipment suppliers. Additional EU listings could prolong these losses if they disrupt damaged refineries’ remaining equipment or financing relationships. Higher global prices, however, can offset some of this pressure. Russia’s estimated oil-export revenues rose 25% in September from the previous month, to $17.7 billion, as the Middle East war pushed up global prices, even as export volumes remained below their level a year earlier.
US efforts to relax restrictions on Russian diesel sales and discourage Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries could also ease pressure on Russia’s energy sector. President Trump has repeatedly demanded that Ukraine cease its attacks on Russian refineries. On October 9, the US Treasury also issued General License 135, authorizing transactions involving Russian diesel sales and deliveries, including imports into the United States, until April 7, 2027. The administration’s stated aim is to ease fuel prices by bringing additional Russian supplies onto global markets. The license could also make Russian diesel easier to sell and finance in other markets by reducing US sanctions risk for covered transactions. However, US banks and importers have been reluctant to handle Russian diesel because of legal questions and commercial risks; as of November 12, none of the four tankers initially expected to deliver Russian diesel to the United States had unloaded their cargo at a US port.
The preliminary October sanctions draft included smaller regional banks, citing lenders that gave Russian military personnel extra time to repay loans. Russia had responded to earlier financial restrictions partly by shifting trade payments from dollars to yuan, as China’s growing importance as a trading partner made its currency a practical alternative. Russian businesses could receive yuan from Chinese customers and use that currency to pay Chinese suppliers. However, the yuan’s share of payments for Russian exports has fallen to 22%, roughly half its mid-2024 peak, while rubles accounted for 69% of payments for exports to Asia. This could be a result of large Chinese banks being cautious about dealing with sanctioned Russian entities because they fear losing access to dollar markets. A Bank of Finland study also found that transactions had been moving through smaller intermediaries, with increased payment delays and high transaction costs.
Europe’s sanctions also depend on how consistently its members enforce them. Governments agree to common restrictions at the EU level, while national competent authorities, including customs authorities, check shipments and apply the rules. In a report on sanctions covering non-energy goods published on November 10, the European Court of Auditors found that sanctions had reduced direct exports of critical military goods to Russia. However, unclear rules allowed countries to interpret exemptions differently, while inconsistent checks and information sharing created opportunities for circumvention. Businesses could route trade through member states with weaker controls, undermining restrictions that other countries enforced more strictly.
Closing these enforcement gaps would help Europe sustain economic pressure on Russia while peace talks proceed. The G7 declaration published on November 11 paired support for US-led negotiations and a comprehensive, reciprocal ceasefire with continued sanctions coordination. Ministers identified a mutual halt to attacks on energy infrastructure and in the Black Sea as an initial step toward peace, while identifying insurers, oil traders and other shadow-fleet intermediaries as priorities for further action.
The talks also concern the protections Ukraine would receive after an agreement. On November 10, EU, French, German, Italian, British, Ukrainian, US and NATO representatives met in Abu Dhabi before the separate US-mediated negotiations involving Russia and Ukraine. They backed a settlement preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and ability to make independent decisions, supported by credible security guarantees. The purpose of those guarantees is to make a ceasefire more durable by deterring a future attack on Ukraine. The joint statement endorsed that objective without specifying military commitments or an agreed response to renewed aggression.
Discussions on Europe’s security architecture give European governments a direct stake in the outcome, even though their negotiating role remains contested. Russia is demanding Ukrainian withdrawal from territory still held by Kyiv and a broader agreement on Europe’s security arrangements, while Ukraine wants a ceasefire before territorial discussions. European and NATO representatives held side consultations in Abu Dhabi but did not join the direct trilateral talks, and Russia’s lead negotiator questioned their involvement. The two-day meeting produced an agreement in principle on a major prisoner exchange, leaving the central disputes unresolved. With the central disputes unresolved, EU sanctions remain one means of applying economic pressure as European governments seek a greater role in negotiations that will shape their own security.
US Developments
US Designates Three Guatemalan Groups as Terrorists Over Alleged Cartel Ties
On November 13, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) designated Guatemala-based Los Mendoza Drug Trafficking Organization (“DTO”) and Los Huistas DTO as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (“SDGTs”) for allegedly providing material support to the Sinaloa Cartel and, in the case of Los Huistas, Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (“CJNG”). The Department of State designated both cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (“FTOs”) and SDGTs in February 2025. Also on November 13, the State Department designated Los Lorenzanas as an FTO and an SDGT.
Los Mendoza and Los Huistas allegedly control trafficking corridors along Guatemala’s borders with Mexico and Honduras and serve as logistics partners for the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG, according to Treasury. Los Mendoza allegedly provides access to border crossings, clandestine airstrips, storage facilities, and local protection networks in three Guatemalan departments. Los Huistas allegedly serves as a key link in the cocaine trafficking supply chain and has used ties to local businessmen, law enforcement officials, and politicians to shield its operations.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the action exposes ties between “politically influential Guatemalan criminal organizations” and Mexican FTOs, and the US Embassy in Guatemala has reportedly called for vigilance at the presidential, legislative, and municipal levels ahead of Guatemala’s 2027 elections, though the Trump Administration has not to date extend sanctions designations to Guatemalan officials who allegedly protect these groups.
Democratic Congress Could Revisit Russian Diesel License
Democrats won control of both the House and the Senate on November 3, according to Associated Press race calls, and will organize the new Congress when it convenes in January 2027. Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-NY), the top Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced a bipartisan bill on October 16 that would nullify the OFAC general licenses authorizing Russian diesel imports and bar future ones. Lawmakers from both parties also warned banks and ports against those imports in October, as we covered in our November 2 update. Whether the new majorities use hearings or legislation to constrain Russia-related GL 135 remains unclear, and any such bill would need the President’s signature or a veto override.
UK Developments
UK Imposes New Russian Energy-Related Sanctions
The UK Government has designated nine entities and specified 11 ships under the UK’s Russia sanctions regime. According to a UK Government press release, these measures target shadow fleet vessels involved in the transport of Russian oil and LNG, major coal companies, and Rosneft’s flagship Arctic oil and gas project, LLC Vostok Oil. The UK Government has also designated PJSC Oil and Gas Company Slavneft, making the UK the first country in the world to have sanctioned all of Russia’s top ten oil producers. Those designated also include PJSC Sibur Holding and JSC Nipigazpererabotka. The newly designated entities are now subject to asset freezes, trust services, director disqualification, and transport sanctions. The newly specified ships are now subject to shipping sanctions and, in the case of several of the specified vessels, trade sanctions. The measures build on previous rounds of UK sanctions relating to the Russia energy sector and reflect the UK Government’s continued focus on targeting Russia’s energy revenue chain across the oil and gas sectors to further constrain Russia’s ability to generate revenue and finance its war in Ukraine.
OFSI Publishes Overseas Business Information Sheet
OFSI has published an information sheet for overseas businesses to assist them in understanding their obligations under UK sanctions, identifying potential sanctions risks, and taking appropriate steps to manage UK sanctions risks. The information sheet includes QR codes to support overseas businesses in accessing information about UK sanctions and, when necessary, to submit confidential reports to OFSI.
EU Developments
EU to Present its 22nd Sanctions Package Against Russia
In a joint statement on November 12, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and President of the European Council António Costa announced that the Commission will present its 22nd sanctions package against Russia at the European Council meeting on November 26–27. The package’s presentation will coincide with discussions on Ukraine’s financing needs for 2027.
According to reports, the 22nd sanctions package is expected to include new restrictions on banks, cryptocurrencies and crypto platforms, as well as measures to address circumvention through third countries. A ban on Russian and Belarusian athletes competing in international sporting events in the EU and visa restrictions on Russian former combatants are also reportedly under discussion. Further details on the scope and content of the proposed restrictive measures are expected when the Commission presents the package.
The announcement comes amid renewed diplomatic efforts to end Russia’s war against Ukraine, including peace talks in Abu Dhabi and discussions at the European Political Community summit in Dublin, where Presidents von der Leyen and Costa met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The joint statement reaffirmed the EU’s support for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine that safeguards the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Von der Leyen and Costa also underscored the importance of continued financial and military assistance and further sanctions to strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating position and press Russia to engage genuinely in the peace process.
EU Council Adopts New Sanctions Listings Targeting Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad
On November 16, the EU Council added the social media news outlet Gaza Now and its founder, Mustafa Moin Ayash, to the EU sanctions list targeting Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
According to the statements of reasons accompanying the new listings, Gaza Now has solicited donations for Hamas, including through cryptocurrency. The EU Council therefore considers both Ayash and Gaza Now to be participating in the financing of Hamas. With these additions, 22 individuals and four entities are designated under the EU sanctions framework against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and those who support, facilitate or enable their violent actions.
European Court of Auditors Publishes Special Report on EU Trade Sanctions Against Russia
The European Court of Auditors (ECA) has issued Special Report 30/2026 examining whether the European Commission effectively supported and monitored Member States’ implementation of EU trade sanctions against Russia. The Report recognizes the Commission’s extensive coordination efforts and finds that trade sanctions, together with anti-circumvention measures, have significantly reduced EU–Russia trade. According to the Report, direct EU exports to Russia of common high-priority goods, including restricted dual-use goods and advanced technology items used in Russian military systems, have almost ceased since 2023. However, legal ambiguities, divergent national enforcement practices and insufficient information-sharing continue to limit uniform and effective implementation.
The ECA identifies “forum-shopping” as a key risk undermining the effective implementation of EU trade sanctions. Specifically, differences in national customs controls create opportunities for businesses to deliberately choose authorization offices or customs points in Member States applying less stringent controls. The Report also identifies uncertainty surrounding terms in EU sanctions law such as “best efforts” and “strictly necessary”, gaps in the Commission’s non-binding guidance, and uneven use of EU information-exchange systems.
With a target implementation date of 2027, the ECA recommends that the Commission improve legal certainty in its proposals and guidance by avoiding ambiguous terms and addressing operational issues arising from differences between customs and sanctions terminology. It also recommends an in-depth analysis of whether Member States uniformly implement and enforce EU trade sanctions. For 2028, the ECA recommends that the Commission encourage EU Member States’ authorities to make full use of information-exchange systems, strengthen monitoring through integrated data collection, analysis and compliance tracking, and propose effectiveness criteria for EU trade sanctions, with regular assessments based on those criteria.
Asia-Pacific Developments
China Introduces Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law with Countermeasures Provision
The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted the Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law of the People's Republic of China, which will strengthen China's framework for combating cross-border corruption and promoting international anti-corruption cooperation. Of particular note, similar to China’s Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, Article 6 of the new anti-corruption law authorizes China to take corresponding countermeasures where a foreign state, under the pretext of anti-corruption enforcement or through the extraterritorial application of its domestic laws, is deemed to undermine China's sovereignty, contain or suppress China, or impose discriminatory restrictions on Chinese citizens, enterprises, or other organizations. Available measures may include counter-sanctions and blocking measures. The law contains 47 articles covering enforcement mechanisms, governmental responsibilities, case handling, and international cooperation.
China Extends Sanctions Suspension on Hanwha Ocean by 2 Months
China has extended by two months the suspension of countermeasures imposed on five U.S. subsidiaries of Hanwha Ocean. The measures were originally adopted following allegations that the subsidiaries cooperated with a U.S. Section 301 investigation concerning China's shipbuilding and maritime industries. According to China's Ministry of Commerce, the extension was made pursuant to the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and related implementing regulations. The decision continues the suspension of countermeasures established under MOFCOM Decree No. 6 of 2025.
Australia Imposes Magnitsky-Style Sanctions on Sudanese Military Leaders
Australia has imposed targeted Magnitsky-style sanctions and travel bans on four Sudanese individuals, as well as targeted financial sanctions on one entity, in response to the ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis in Sudan. The designations include senior leaders of both the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), including SAF Commander-in-Chief Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman al-Burhan and RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo Mousa. The new measures build upon sanctions previously imposed by Australia under the United Nations Security Council sanctions framework for Sudan.
Russia Places Japan Tobacco's Russian Assets Under Temporary State Management
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree placing assets of Japan Tobacco International (JTI) in Russia under the temporary management of a Russian entity. The measure affects four JTI manufacturing facilities, including cigarette factories located in St. Petersburg, Rostov-on-Don, Lipetsk, and the Leningrad region. According to Russian state media, the action was taken pursuant to a presidential decree issued in April 2023 establishing a mechanism for the temporary administration of assets belonging to entities from countries designated as "unfriendly" by Russia. The measure is the latest in a series of retaliatory actions against companies from jurisdictions that have imposed sanctions on Russia in connection with the war in Ukraine.